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Abstract 
 
The category of „organism‟ has an ambiguous status: is it scientific or is it 
philosophical? Or, if one looks at it from within the relatively recent field or 
sub-field of philosophy of biology, is it a central, or at least legitimate 
category therein, or should it be dispensed with? In any case, it has long 
served as a kind of scientific “bolstering” for a philosophical train of 
argument which seeks to refute the “mechanistic” or “reductionist” trend, 
which has been perceived as dominant since the 17
th
 century, whether in the 
case of Stahlian animism, Leibnizian monadology, the neo-vitalism of Hans 
Driesch, or, lastly, of the “phenomenology of organic life” in the 20th century, 
with authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Georges 
Canguilhem. In this paper I try to reconstruct some of the main interpretive 
„stages‟ or „layers‟ of the concept of organism in order to critically evaluate 
it. How might „organism‟ be a useful concept if one rules out the excesses of 
„organismic‟ biology and metaphysics? Varieties of instrumentalism and 
what I call the „projective‟ concept of organism are appealing, but perhaps 
ultimately unsatisfying. 
 
 
 
 1. 
 
What is an organism? There have been a variety of answers to this question, not just in the 
sense of different definitions (an organism is a biological individual; it is a living being, or 
at least the difference between a living organism and a dead organism is somehow 
significant in a way that does not seem to make sense for other sorts of entities, like lamps 
and chairs; it is a self-organizing, metabolic system; etc.) but more tendentiously, in the 
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sense that philosophers, scientists, „natural philosophers‟ and others have both asserted 
and denied the existence of organisms. And of course, the existence or better, the reality of 
organisms is intimately bound up with a host of other weighty matters, such as the 
emergence of biology as an autonomous discipline, and its subsequent efforts to maintain 
that autonomy; how to account for the animate dimension of animate beings, in the 
absence of a concept of immortal soul; and more recent debates both internal to biology 
and spanning fields such as the philosophy of biology, such as the status of genes, 
populations, ecosystems and so on. To inquire into the ontological status of organisms, in 
such a tense, overdetermined field of theories, polemics and associations is somehow 
already to seem to take a stand, much like those professional skeptics who never seem to 
be able to shake off their life-long obsession with the paranormal. That is, if we seek to 
dispel some of the confusion and categorize some of the different positions on the issue, 
we are already granting that there could be an ontological status of organisms; that the 
question makes sense. 
 
Disciplinary boundaries are not easy to employ here, because in one generation thinkers 
are using „organism‟ as a term directly derived from „natural philosophy‟ with the 
(empirical, experimental) authority that this grants; in another generation it has become 
something fully „conceptual‟, or even ideological, as when Hans Jonas, opposing the 
world of conscious organisms to the „dead‟ world of mechanical Nature, insists that “the 
point of life itself” lies in “its being self-centered individuality”; Jonas calls this “the 
ontological concept of an individual, as against a merely phenomenological one” (Jonas 
1966, 79). Here we are being told not just that organisms exist and we should not deprive 
them of their reality in favor of genes, molecules or conversely populations; we are being 
told that such deprivation is wrong, almost morally wrong, which is not so surprising if we 
consider that historically, the case can be made that „organism‟ is initially a naturalistic 
substitute for „soul‟ (in the Leibniz-Stahl debate of the late 17th and early 18th century). 
“The history of the concept of organism in the 18th century can be summed up as the 
search, by naturalists, physicians and philosophers, for replacements or semantic 
equivalents for the soul, which could account for the increasingly well-established fact of 
the functional unity of a system of integrated parts” (Canguilhem 1989, 551). 
 
Organism is a hybrid concept, located from the outset between different kinds of practices, 
constantly shifting in between the factual and what one might call the supra-factual. 
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Organisms can thus be metaphysical; empirical-but-used-for-metaphysical-purposes; 
ideological; and restrictively biological concepts. They can be particular states of matter, 
or particular types of living beings chosen as experimental objects, like the fruit fly or c. 
elegans, which are „model organisms‟; worse still, at least for the sake of finding a 
manageable ontological box in which to fit them, on some definitions “humongous fungi” 
weighing ten tons, coral reefs, „living, breathing‟ termite mounds or forests qualify as 
organisms (Turner 2000, Wilson 2007, Bouchard 2009). So even a study limiting itself to 
the rhetoric of science would be very large
1
; it is not surprising that a short but insightful 
study of its history in modern biology called the organism “biology‟s phoenix” (Benson 
1989). 
 
To sort out the disappearances and returns of this hybrid, „phoenix‟ concept, even in part, 
requires a combination of historical and critical analysis. The latter is not exactly identical 
with the type of analysis practiced by mainstream philosophy of biology, in which the task 
for the philosopher is indeed a kind of specialized conceptual analysis aiming at clarifying 
the implications and perhaps consequences of biological claims; so for instance, a recent 
and influential definition of the discipline explains that it is “concerned with those 
biological debates in which conceptual and empirical issues are so entangled that progress 
demands both scientific knowledge and the tools of philosophical analysis” (Stotz, 
Griffiths and Knight 2004, 647). I of course concur with this definition, but wish in 
addition to locate something about the concept of organism and to critique it. In that sense 
I take quite seriously the moral that “biology‟s exciting conclusions do not follow from the 
facts alone” (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999, 5).  
 
The interpretive, conceptual, clarifying and evaluative task at hand is not then just a matter 
of drawing subjective philosophical conclusions from an objective scientific set of facts; it 
involves making (and again, evaluating) ontological claims about the nature of biological 
entities, which have an irreducibly normative component (in the sense that their activity is 
interrelated with the norms of such activity). There is a role for the philosopher in 
discerning what gets to count as “real patterns,” in Dennett‟s suggestive phrase (Dennett 
1991). But for various reasons, not least the ever-shifting definitions provided by „working 
biologists‟ (embryological, genetic, molecular, ecological, and now systemic), 
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 See however Schlanger 1971, Schiller 1978 – which is in fact a polemic against the concept of organism 
despite its historical pretentions – and especially Cheung 2006 and 2010. 
 4 
philosophical reflection may benefit in addition from some historical considerations – 
rather than trying to adjudicate between various aprioristic claims and/or scientific 
definitions. After all, as Manfred Laubichler noted in a review essay with the endearing 
title, “The Organism is dead. Long live the organism!” (Laubichler 2000), there have been 
many histories of the gene, and few, if any, histories of the organism (with the above-
mentioned exception of Benson 1989, which is intended more as a programmatic 
statement). 
 
In the next section (§ 2) I provide a brief overview of the emergence of the term and its 
„episodic history‟ including in the 20th century, in order to further specify the problem of 
what sort of object we are addressing, which sort of discourse is meant to be authoritative 
(„who owns it‟), and so on. In section 3 I describe some of the polarizations that have 
arisen, and suggest some basic criteria a theory of organism needs to abide by if it is to be 
viable. In section 4 I turn to the varieties of mechanistic approaches to organism, including 
the complexified, organizational approach we owe to Claude Bernard, in contradistinction 
to the conception of organism as a kind of paramount subjectivity. In section 5 I introduce 
the distinction between Kant‟s regulative approach to organism (which, I argue, can be 
extended through the work of Kurt Goldstein and Daniel Dennett) and the post-Kantian 
ontologization thereof. I extend this discussion in section 6, and introduce the distinction 
between methodological and ontological views of organism; but I quickly point out the 
insufficiency of such distinctions. In section 7 I discuss various conceptions of the „unity‟ 
which is meant to characterize organisms, and conclude in section 8 with some critical 
reflections on holism and the theory of systems. Overall I argue for some combination of 
what I call the „projective‟ view of organisms (Goldstein et al.) and the „organizational‟ 
view, recently restated by William Bechtel. 
 
 
2. 
 
If we look at the historical context, the word emerges in the late 17
th
-early 18
th
 centuries, 
in particular in the debate between Leibniz and the chemist and physician Georg-Ernest 
Stahl (the author in 1708 of a treatise entitled On the difference between mechanism and 
organism), who was the chief representative of the animist position, according to which all 
animate motions are explainable in terms of the soul (Duchesneau 1998, 335f.; 
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Duchesneau 2000). After this one doesn‟t find the term much used in our sense in which it 
is opposed, e.g., to „machine‟ until the late 18th century: in Diderot and D‟Alembert‟s 
Encyclopédie there are almost no occurrences of the term „organism‟; one finds the 
adjective „organic‟, which dates back at least to the 14th century. And in several of its 
occurrences, „organism‟ (“organisme”) clearly does not yet have the sense we associate 
with it; the article “Fibre” speaks of “the organism or mechanism of these various parts” 
(Diderot and D‟Alembert (eds.), 1751-1780, VI, 670); the vitalist physician Bordeu, in a 
late work, the Recherches sur les maladies chroniques of 1775, speaks in a way we would 
find strange or confusing today, of the “organism of the living body” (Bordeu 1818, vol. 2, 
1024).  
 
The technical term in the Enlightenment for „physiological structure‟ was rather 
organisation, defined in the Encyclopédie as “arrangement des parties qui constituent les 
corps animés” (Diderot and D‟Alembert (eds.), 1751-1780, IX, 629b); it is comparable, 
and related to, terms such as „organized bodies‟ and „animal economy‟, the latter 
designating both a kind of theoretical approach in medicine and physiology to the living 
body, and that body itself.
2
 Even a work filled with teleology and purposiveness like 
Kant‟s Third Critique doesn‟t contain the term „organism‟; it only appears in his Opus 
postumum.
3
 Kant speaks instead of “organized bodies.” Notice – and this illustrates the 
„hybridity‟ of the concept – that the notion is located from the outset at the intersection of 
philosophical inquiry into the status of living beings (Leibniz, Kant) and properly 
biological reflection. The existence in addition of a variety of natural-philosophical works 
in this period, dealing with such topics, by authors such as Francis Glisson, Walter 
Charleton, Robert Boyle or Claude Perrault (Wolfe forthcoming 2010a), does not alter the 
fact of this hybridity. 
 
Aside from the classical authors mentioned above (and I‟ll say more about Leibniz and 
Kant below), philosophers in the 20
th
 century have had a certain interest in the concept of 
organism, especially phenomenologically motivated authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Hans 
Jonas, and on the other side of the Rhine, Henri Bergson, Gilbert Simondon, and Raymond 
Ruyer – all of whom argue for such a concept, although in different ways, as I shall 
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 On „organisation‟ and „organism‟ see Balan 1975, Figlio 1976, Guillo 2003, Wolfe 2004, Wolfe 2009, 
Cheung 2010; on the notion of the animal economy in vitalist medicine see Wolfe and Terada 2008. 
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 See Debru 1980, Huneman 2007, and Huneman 2010. 
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discuss below (namely, some, like Goldstein articulate what I shall call a projective view 
of organism as a „construct with benefits‟, so to speak, while others like Jonas or Ruyer 
seem to follow a line consonant with strong vitalism, in which the organism appears, not 
just ontologically specific but almost transcendent with regard to the rest of the natural 
world) .
4
 And there was of course a significant group of biologists in England in the early 
decades of the century who were equally concerned with „organism‟ and „holism‟ 
(Haldane et al., 1918), as well as geneticists who were, curiously enough, followers of 
Whitehead, including W.E. Agar, who late in his career wrote an entire treatise on 
organism (Agar 1943). 
 
It is worth noting that contrary to what one reads often, including in the brief historical 
references in most contemporary philosophy of biology (including Gilbert and Sarkar 
2000), holism was never intended by any of its early 20
th
-century founders such as Jan 
Smuts (Smuts 1926) to be synonymous with organicism or vitalism, for the simple reason 
that it seeks to find general organizational laws, inspired by physics, without insisting on 
the uniqueness of Life; it is the thesis of “global dependence.”5 But of course holism could 
be used to articulate organismic theory, and it was. The theoretical point that emerges 
from this early 20
th
-century historical context is that there are two distinct areas of tension: 
first, an older but enduring tension between mechanism and organism, in which each of 
these allows of different degrees of interpretation (see below § 4), and second a 20
th
-
century tension between mechanists („reductionists‟) and holists. Again, the two can 
sometimes coincide and form a battery of arguments in favour of „organicism‟. 
 
                                                 
4
 Ruyer, who in other respects was a significant philosopher, reads like the worst parts of Driesch when 
dealing with biological matters: he warns the reader that because of contemporary science we must choose 
between “a generalized „theory of organism‟ and the theory of “a „generalized molecule‟” (Ruyer 1952, 
166); indeed, he regrets that molecular explanations do away with Drieschian entelechies by reducing 
embryo development to physicochemical laws (Ruyer 1946, 80). Even Bergson is too mechanistic and 
Cartesian for Ruyer, in the sense that he had an excessively spatial understanding of the body (Ruyer 1946, 
30)! 
5
 So, e.g. Köhler‟s Gestalt psychology is a form of holism, in which he tries to model psychological theory 
on the field theory of Faraday and Maxwell. Of course, there are also contradictory moments such as when 
the founder of systems biology, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, invokes holism as a total systemic standpoint 
(again, with no reference to any special status of living entities), but earlier says that it sheds particular light 
on embryology and how organisms are not mere machines (he refers both to their teleology and their 
„historical character‟, a phrase we also find in Goldstein): von Bertalanffy 1933, 9, 33, 52; he wrote further 
essays on organismic theory later in life. In other papers from the early years of systems theory there is also 
the recognition that the boundaries of a system are subjective; hence the boundary between the living and the 
non-living is not the issue. 
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We are familiar with the story of the eclipse of organism concepts in twentieth-century 
biology, which has multiple possible causes, ranging from the rise of genetics (from 
Watson and Crick in 1953 to the Human Genome Project) to the emergence of 
evolutionary biology in its own right. At first the latter may seem like a more receptive 
environment for organism concepts, as has been argued in recent decades by various 
strands of developmentalist theories, but in a very basic sense evolutionary biology tends 
to combine a supra-organismal level such as populations with a sub-organismal level 
(genes); the organism no longer has much explanatory force here (Walsh 2010). In 
addition, faced with the molecularization of biological entities, it‟s not just that the 
organism might seem old-fashioned or in need of deflationary treatment; in addition, it 
seems to proclaim by its very name that it transcends the mechanistic, causal world, or 
equally problematic, that it introduces other forms of causality: circular, top-down, non-
linear… This is partly captured in Haldane‟s quip which makes it sound like the harmless 
word „organism‟ is in fact the mysterious technical term „norganism‟: “but it‟s a 
norganism, my dear young fellow, a norganism !” (Haldane, in Huxley 1971, 138). 
Nowadays, “both scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction for granted… 
Organisms are „nothing but‟ atoms, and that is that” (Hull 1981, 282). “Organisms have 
disappeared as the fundamental units of life. In their place we now have genes …” 
(Goodwin 1994, 1). 
 
At the very least, “the „organism‟ turns out to be a highly contestable notion” (Sterelny 
and Griffiths 1999, 173). And yet, organisms are also „paradigm cases‟ – of individuals, of 
purposive entities, without either of these notions having to rest on a particular restrictive 
definition of „Life‟ versus „non-Life‟. The challenge for the philosopher is not just to „pick 
out‟ features of these entities (or conversely, reject the entire idea) but to navigate in 
between the Charybdis of self-contented molecular reductionism, and the Scylla of knee-
jerk, biophilosophical anti-reductionism. To inquire conceptually into the ontological 
status of organisms in this sense includes, as I indicated above, a critical and evaluative 
assessment of the overdeterminations, vocabulary shifts, and ideological commitments 
inherent in the notion. To be clear, I am not looking for a definition of organism, whether 
in strict descriptive terms, e.g., as a “self-maintaining, autonomous and physically 
bounded entity” (Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. 2000, 222), or in more metaphysical terms 
as “the only type of individual” that combines “functional and self-reproductive identity” 
at once (ibid., 229); for definitions run the risk of reverting to the form of assertions such 
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as „the organism is essentially self-consciousness‟ or „the organism is in its essence 
temporal rather than merely spatial‟. Instead, I discuss attempts to describe the category of 
organism in less „definitional‟ terms, either as forms of organization or as forms of 
projection (§§ 5-7). 
 
3. 
 
Is it possible to „evaluate the value‟ or the legitimacy of the concept of organism? Yes, 
inasmuch as it expresses a polarization between two visions of what living beings are, 
which imply in turn two visions of human being, that is, two visions of the place of human 
beings in the natural world, and by that token, two ideological attitudes towards science. In 
that sense there are not two different sets of concepts, one philosophical, and one 
scientific. Whenever the term is used in any sense beyond the completely neutral one, e.g. 
saying how many microorganisms inhabit a given space, or which traits contribute to the 
fitness of an organism (cases in which organisms per se are not being distinguished from 
anything else), it possesses a kind of valuative dimension. 
 
Thus the defender of the „strong concept‟ of organism, not content to assert à la Heidegger 
that “science does not think” and end it there, will try and shift the conflict into the 
territory of science itself, within science itself, and will say that there should be a science 
of the organism itself, a holistic science, a „new paradigm‟ (as was frequently proclaimed 
about chaos theory and then self-organization
6
), which would overcome or refute the 
excessively reductionist paradigm due to the Scientific Revolution. In some narratives, 
including reductionist reconstructions of the history of biology provided by figures such as 
the biochemist Jacques Loeb (Allen 2005, and for a similar argument from a historian‟s 
point of view, Schiller 1978), this paradigm is presented – positively of course – as being 
subsequently reinforced by the mechanization of the circulatory system with Harvey and 
Descartes, and Friedrich Wöhler‟s synthesis of urea in 1828. The latter event signifies the 
artificial production of organic substance by non-organic components, which rendered the 
claim that the chemistry of the living body is categorically distinct from that of inanimate 
bodies, invalid (Brooke 1968, McKie 1944). In anti-reductionist narratives at least since 
Husserl‟s Crisis, the Scientific Revolution is frequently taken as a target for demystifying 
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what should not have been demystified, and thus somehow severing the link between 
humanity and Nature, thus bringing about both the original „explanatory gap(s)‟, the 
problem of qualia (which, it is true, is a Scientific Revolution invention – of Galileo‟s), 
human alienation and the exploitation of Nature (Merchant 1980). 
 
A less emotional version of this sort of narrative is the theoretical biologist Robert Rosen‟s 
assertion that the Newtonian revolution erases the distinction between the organic and the 
inorganic: all material systems can be analyzed as groups of particles moving in force 
fields (with the relevant dynamical equations) (Rosen 1985, 167); Darwin and especially 
Claude Bernard would have been surprised to learn that they were working in a scientific 
context in which there no longer was any distinction between the organic and the 
inorganic! Faced with this gradual process of mechanization and molecularization, an 
eminent scientist like Niels Bohr can say: If you want to push the observation of an 
organism far as possible from the point of view of atomic theory, you will have to 
undertake an intervention that kills it.
7
 We often frequently encounter the judgment that 
so-called „quantitative‟ approaches (whatever they may be) lack finesse and miss 
something crucial about the qualitative dimensions of experience (mind, life, 
consciousness, etc.); the quantitative approach will lack a „feeling for the organism‟, to 
borrow Fox Keller‟s (1983) phrase. Even when Jonas is avoiding overt normative 
language, he still declares that “waiving the intelligibility of life” (i.e., allowing the third-
person descriptions of scientists to trump the fact of human “inwardness”) has the 
consequence of “rendering the world unintelligible as well” (Jonas 1966, 25).8 
 
 Whether or not one accepts the verdict of „mainstream science‟ that the organism in itself 
either does not exist or does not matter (both molecular biology and evolutionary biology 
concur here in denying any inherent reality to the organism;
9
 think of Monod‟s dictum that 
what holds for E. coli holds for the elephant), the problem is that most defenses or 
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 Anti-reductionist arguments are usually answered either by saying „it works!‟ (from medical materialism 
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9
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challenges have something deeply value-laden about them. It is in the name of a certain 
idea of value that one defends a particularity of Life or living being; think of the 
expression „pro-life‟! To that position which says that there is something about life which 
almost prior to argument is valuative, that is, normative in a desirable way, one can reply 
with Nietzsche‟s comment in the Gay Science that “Life is not an argument. Among the 
conditions of life might be error” (Nietzsche 1882/2001, § 121, 117), a comment which 
resonates with the Epicurean, anti-teleological, anti-finalist tradition, but which can also 
be heard in Darwinian terms. We need to evaluate this value in order to see if a certain 
kind of suspicion towards techno-science, AI, Darwinism, reductionism in general is fully 
aware of what it is defending when it invokes the innate value of Life or living being (le 
vivant, das Lebendige); in addition, such criticisms generally fail to take account of the 
obvious fact that Darwinism in almost all its forms is an anti-reductionist discipline or set 
of disciplines, either because they confuse a debunking dimension – Dennett‟s “universal 
acid” – with reductionism proper, or more confusingly, because they build a narrative of 
the “Death of Nature” sort (Merchant 1980) and view Darwin as having proposed 
“mechanisms” of life, hence completing the evil task begun by Descartes and others.10  
 
 If, at the conclusion of this investigation we still have a useful concept of organism, I 
suggest it would have to be compatible with the following three conditions: 
- First, neither the human being nor the earthworm is, to speak with Spinoza, a 
dominion within a dominion, an „empire within an empire‟ or „kingdom within a 
kingdom‟ (an imperium in imperio, in Spinoza‟s famous phrase from the Preface to 
Book III of the Ethics, in which he rejects the idea that we are somehow apart from the 
rest of Nature), including in the sense in which its interiority, subjectivity or 
intentionality would in extremis come and extract it from cold and inhuman 
(“mechanical”) causality; as Canguilhem put it in terms closer to von Uexküll‟s 
Umwelt, “the environment of man‟s sensitive and technical values is no more real, 
taken in itself, than the specific environment of the woodlouse or the gray mouse” 
(Canguilhem 1965, 154 ; cf. Wolfe, ms. 2009); 
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reductionist or at least at odds with traditional reductionist programs does not however entail Robert Rosen‟s 
claim that “Evolution has come to do for biology today what vitalism did for it previously” (Rosen 1991, 
255). 
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- Second, if the idea of reducing an x – here, an organism – to its components 
presents any danger, one would have to show why, rather than use the term 
„reductionism‟ as a term of opprobrium. I am not saying that all critiques of 
reductionism are mistaken: indeed, below I will briefly try and present Kurt 
Goldstein‟s careful and original arguments for his projective and implicative brand of 
holism cum anti-reductionism; 
- Third, in an entirely physical universe composed of physical elements, their 
interactions and the effects of these interactions – in a universe in which, then, as 
Buffon says, “the organic is the most ordinary product of nature” (Buffon 1749, vol. 2, 
39) – if the organism exists, it will not be as an entity existing beyond the physical, 
like a vital force outside of causality; there can be no particular „signature‟ of entities 
like Walter Elsasser‟s „organismic law‟ of the 1960s (e.g. Elsasser 1964, 64; see also 
Elsasser 1961, 28, 30, 35). This is not to say that there is no “radical inhomogeneity” 
at “some level of organization” as he puts it (Elsasser 1964, 54, 63), but such special 
organizational definitions are precisely the sorts of “definitions” I said earlier I was not 
going to consider as viable answers, for categorical reasons. 
 
On the contrary, given these conditions, if we continue to maintain a concept of organism, 
it would seem that it would have to be in a purely instrumental and relational sense – 
although there is something unsatisfying about the purely instrumentalist view, as I shall 
indicate in closing. When biology explains a phenomenon, what does it do? It seeks to 
identify the causes thereof and subsume them under laws. In a universe supposed to be 
exhaustively governed by the laws of physics, reduction is associated with the possibility 
of reducing the laws described by biology to the laws of physics and chemistry. The 
biologist could continue to speak of organisms or genes, but merely as conventional or 
instrumental terms. They belong (on this view) to an already superseded ontology. The 
question for the philosopher of biology would be: is this entity real or not? The 
instrumentalist position denies the essential existence of an entity apart from the physical 
universe, and insists that the ontological commitments of a science are conventional. I will 
accept this instrumentalist proviso but try and give it a slightly more operational meaning. 
That is, if the organism cannot claim to have a privileged status, as in the renewal of 
 12 
Aristotelianism hoped for by some, in the wake of Marjorie Grene
11
; if the organism 
cannot claim to be the basis for a holistic science, the goal of which, as I pointed out, is to 
defend some „value‟ of living being faced with artificiality (cloning, biotechnology, and 
the like) or mechanization, it can still have an existence other than the limbo to which it is 
condemned in molecular biology. 
 
For instance, one can argue for a concept of organism as possessing its own „historicity‟ or 
„temporality‟, which was expressed by Merleau-Ponty in very Goldsteinian terms as the 
corps propre, i.e. the type of relation I can have to my body which is not the same as the 
scientist‟s; a certain kind, of private, ineffable relation – although Patricia Churchland has 
wittily challenged, not the existence of such relations but rather their uniqueness, pointing 
out in perfectly embodied fashion that we can claim to have a first-person, privileged 
relation to all sorts of physical things, including our stomach and bowels, in a state of 
“awareness of visceral circumstance” (Churchland 1988, 282). Similarly, as regards 
ineffable subjectivity, Bill Lycan notes that while it may be true that “I can refer to my 
pain using a concept that no one else can use to refer to my pain,” and a bat (in a well-
known example) can also “refer to its sonar sensation using a concept that no human could 
use,” it does not however follow “that the bat knows or understands a different fact” 
(Lycan 1990, 121). The ontological status of organisms and debates about qualia, 
explanatory gaps and the „hard problem‟ are less far removed than they might appear (this 
similarity at the level of subjectivity and inwardness is in addition to better-known shared 
problems such as the role of functions and teleological explanations, see Kraemer 1984). 
More recently Varela has also insisted on a kind of irreducible first-personness, under the 
influence of Merleau-Ponty, with a newer emphasis on the project of a „first-person 
science‟.12  
 
However much some elements of this phenomenological interpretation provide interesting 
material on how organisms construct their worlds, I would also advocate a healthy 
suspicion towards this reinvestment by phenomenology, inasmuch as in this discourse 
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„organism‟ seems to serve as an excuse to reiterate anti-naturalistic points about the 
„subject‟ or „subjectivity‟. There is a real anti-naturalist war machine in this tradition, 
launched by Husserl, perpetuating the old stiffness of the Cartesian cogito faced with the 
world of nature: “it is only when the mind ceases to naïvely turn towards the outside and 
returns to itself, in order to dwell in itself, purely in itself, that it can be self-sufficient” 
(Husserl 1970, 297; translation modified). The extreme form of this insistence on 
subjectivity and the opposition between flesh and body is Merleau-Ponty‟s sacralization of 
the living organism, when he equates the sensation of an embodied being to a mystical 
communion with divine presence (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 212). Of the figures we shall 
discuss, neither Goldstein nor Varela share this extreme, almost mystical way of 
presenting the organism; however, Varela retains this old insistence on the sovereignty of 
the individual over and against what he perceives as an impersonal evolutionary process:  
I maintain that evolutionary thought, through its emphasis on diversity, 
reproduction, and the species in order to explain the dynamics of change, 
has obscured the necessity of looking at the autonomous nature of living 
units for the understanding of biological phenomenology. Also I think that 
the maintenance of identity and the invariance of defining relations in the 
living unities are at the base of all possible ontogenic and evolutionary 
transformation in biological systems (Varela 1979, 5). 
 
Goldstein, as I discuss below (§ 7), has moments where he speaks of the organism‟s life as 
somehow out of ordinary time, reaching an almost eternal state of self-creation. It is clear 
that if such theories are to be pertinent in a broadly naturalistic sense, we need to add – 
aside from additional philosophical „translation‟ – Darwinian constraints on Goldstein or 
Varela‟s sheer positivity of organism: the organism is not a solitary, self-creating artist! 
Here the need becomes clear for a „dialectical‟, „interactionist‟ vision of organism which is 
Darwinian-compatible and (at least in part) for that reason not so solipsistic, along the 
lines of Lewontin‟s view that “The environment is not an autonomous process but a 
reflection of the biology of the species. Just as there is no organism without an 
environment, so there is no environment without an organism” (Lewontin 1983/1985, 
99).
13
 
 
                                                 
13
 Lewontin‟s „dialectical‟ and Oyama‟s „interactionist‟ theories of organism and environment as systems are 
by no means the same, but they are frequently discussed together and for present purposes serve as 
„flagbearers‟ of various movements to remove the organism from its Romantic solitude and consider it as 
one of many interacting entities (but without, conversely, reducing this process to a dematerialized, holistic 
theory either, as I discuss in closing). I am grateful to Thomas Pradeu for past conversations on these topics. 
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 4. 
 
To see how one might arrive at this understanding of organism, it is helpful to look 
historically again at how the notion appeared: it was, evidently one might say, against the 
background of, or in contradistinction to, the notion of machine. The mechanical 
philosophy – Boyle, Hobbes, Descartes but also iatromechanism as a research program in 
physiology and medicine, with figures such as Giorgio Baglivi and Hermann Boerhaave – 
rested on the notion that natural phenomena result from interactions between material 
particles governed by the laws of mechanics. This enabled the formulation of laws of 
motion and the invention of particular mechanisms (from clockwork to Vaucanson‟s 
mechanical duck), the latter allowing one to explain particular phenomena. Baglivi stated 
in 1696 that he wanted to carry out a program which would demonstrate that “the human 
body is nothing other than a complex system of mechanical and chemical motions obeying 
mathematical laws” (Baglivi 1696, I, xi, §§ 6-7). In an equally influential 1703 lecture – 
explicitly entitled on “The Usefulness of the Mechanical Method in Medicine” – 
Boerhaave stated with even more ontological surety that “the human body is in its nature 
the same as the whole of the Universe which is open to our view” (Boerhaave 1703/1983, 
96).  
 
What‟s curious is that biology – the science of life – emerges in this period; biology is 
constituted for and by a mechanical, mechanistic model which is itself blind to the concept 
of life; of course, the very fact that this model, or family of models, was so productive 
might lead one to suspect that the model was not so blind!
14
 This point has been nicely 
brought to light, specifically with regard to the Paris Académie des Sciences, by Salomon-
Bayet (1978): the Académie is set up to investigate natural phenomena on a mechanistic, 
Cartesian basis and yet from the outset its own reports, on natural history, physiology, 
anatomy (including the famous “querelle des monstres,” see Wolfe 2005) contradicts that 
basis in all sorts of ways. Similarly, if one looked closely at La Mettrie‟s famous 
                                                 
14
 That the opposition between „machines and organisms‟ or „mechanism and teleology‟ is much less 
obvious than it appears, even in the early modern period, is a topic that goes beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Consider Boyle‟s „hydraulico-pneumatic‟ model for the human body (and his defence of final causes); 
even Cartesian mechanistic physiology, far from denying the existence of goal-directed processes, was in 
fact replete with functional language, e.g. when discussing the circulation of blood and the motion of heart. 
The Cartesian point (following a suggestion in Gaukroger 2000) is not that bodies actually are machines (an 
eliminativist view) but rather that the structure and behaviour of bodies are to be explained in the same way 
that we explain the structure and behaviour of machines (a reductionist view). See also Wolfe (forthcoming 
2010a, 2010b). 
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L‟Homme-Machine of 1748, one would find out that it is not really very mechanistic, at 
least in the traditional sense; that is, it aims at locating some of the physiological 
mechanisms particular to living, organic beings (Thomson 1988) without thereby 
eliminating all specifically organic properties in favour of mechanical ones (Wolfe 
forthcoming 2010b). More than a century later, Claude Bernard stated that scientifically, 
“we are right to treat the organism like a machine,” but he immediately introduces a 
somewhat puzzling distinction: we are “mistaken when we treat it as a mechanical 
machine, fixed and unchanging”; rather, “the organism is an organic machine, which 
possesses a flexible mechanism, thanks to special organic processes which exist therein; 
but these do not transgress any of the general laws of mechanics, physics or chemistry” 
(Bernard 1937, cit. in Canguilhem 1989, 552). 
 
Physiologists such as Walter Cannon, theoretical biologists such as Francisco Varela and 
philosophers such as William Bechtel have, in their respective ways, each promoted this 
Bernardian concept of an “organic machine” (as a homeostatic, autopoietic or 
organizational whole comprised of micro-mechanisms), and indeed, we have here a rare 
case where the historical and the conceptual complexities seem to cohere, around the 
status of „mechanism‟ (weak or strong), „mechanisms‟ (as pluralistic) and „mechanical 
models‟ (as essentially heuristic). The core insight I wish to derive from this is that a 
mechanical model is nothing else than a heuristic model designed to explain something 
about the object which „organicists‟ seek a monopoly on, namely Life. Recent work on 
mechanism, like recent reevaluations of organisation or „animal economy‟, tend to blur 
the divide between the two concepts.
15
 Mechanism, Bechtel suggests, can provide a 
adequate account of organization (a more structural word for „organism‟) by “placing as 
much emphasis on understanding the particular ways in which biological mechanisms are 
organized as it has on discovering the component parts of the mechanisms and their 
operations” (Bechtel 2007, 270). There is an important dialectical relationship between the 
mechanistic explanatory programme to study (by reduction, modeling and componential 
analysis) the structures at work in organisms, and the organicist (vitalist, holist) standpoint 
which minimally “remind[s] mechanists of the shortfalls of the mechanistic accounts on 
offer,” for ideas such as “negative feedback, self-organizing positive feedback, and cyclic 
                                                 
15
 Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Bechtel 2007; Wolfe and Terada 2008, §§ 4-6. For a contrary view, 
reiterating the value – scientific and philosophical – of the opposition, see Gierer 1996. 
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organization are critical to explaining the phenomena exhibited by living organisms” 
(ibid., 296-297). 
 
Vitalistically inclined figures such as Bichat and Bernard, in Bechtel‟s argument (to which 
one can add the Montpellier vitalist Barthez a generation earlier), usefully formulate 
challenges to the mechanistic model (without, one might add, offering any foundationalist 
ontological rejection of it). Indeed, it is a characteristic trait of all these thinkers to reject 
their predecessors … as “vitalists,” obviously in a pejorative sense, and also target earlier 
(iatro-)mechanists such as Borelli or Boerhaave for not fulfilling their scientific 
obligations. Théophile de Bordeu, a prominent Montpellier vitalist physician, complained 
explicitly about the obscurantism of some his teachers in his 1775 Recherches sur les 
maladies chroniques: “We used to ask . . . what this vital principle that was responsible for 
night and day (qui opère le blanc et le noir), and governed that which was opposed to it” 
(Bordeu 1818, vol. 2, 972). But a short time later Cuvier includes Bordeu amongst the 
culprits: Stahlian animism, he claims, was taken on in modified form by the Montpellier 
vitalists; “in addition to the contradictions and metaphysical obscurity generated by a 
purported local sensibility without perception, which all these physicians found to exist in 
particular organs, and some still maintain, one can also reproach them for over-using [the 
notion of] what they termed the vital principle, using this occult entity quite vaguely, in 
order to attribute to it all the phenomena they found difficult to explain” (Cuvier 1810, II, 
232). The point is not just that „vitalists‟ frequently have to define themselves over and 
against vitalist predecessors, who they have to portray as being overly metaphysical and 
lacking experimental backing for their ideas; it is also that this rhetorical complexity is 
part of the nature of concepts such as „organism‟ or „organization‟, which are meant to 
explain the special features of living organisms, while also being concepts open to the 
mechanist (for further discussion of this sort of rhetorical tension surrounding terms like 
„vitalism‟, see Oyama 2010). 
 
An interesting point raised by Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. (the juxtaposition of the two 
points is mine, not theirs; Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. 2000, 231) is that organism may 
not be a necessary or necessarily interesting organizing point for biological inquiry, 
inasmuch as some biological fields will simply not need to make use of the concept, but 
that at the same time it is a kind of „primitive‟ which cannot be reduced to its components, 
even if these are construed as mechanisms (which indeed we might construe in the above 
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sense of homeostatic wholes composed of various micromechanisms). Indeed, for every 
“uniquely biological concept” such as homeostasis (whether we take this as a merely 
empirical concept or in its more hypostatized forms as a kind of ontological „marker‟ of 
Life), there is a deflationary, mechanistically specifiable concept that will match it, such as 
H. Ross Ashby‟s „homeostat‟; but this should not entail that we dispense with all 
properties of organisms in favour of the properties of familiar machines; rather, following 
intuitions of Boerhaave, La Mettrie, Bernard, mechanisms, organization and organisms 
should be understood more dialectically as interrelated concepts. 
 
In sharp contrast to this vision in which organisms are real but not categorically separate 
from mechanisms, or, put differently, that their reality is „organizational‟ rather than 
somehow „essential‟, to the extent that a degree of interpretation (of projection, of 
heuristics) is incorporated in the concept of organism, we find the vision of organisms as 
paramount, embodied subjectivities. One must note that this is both equally compelling, 
equally congenial to common sense on some definitions (Dennett has written at great 
lengths about the „feeling‟ we have that “someone is home” when we are faced with a 
human, an animal or a particularly mobile intentional agent of the robot variety), and has 
been espoused by a variety of important thinkers, as I indicate below. That does not mean 
it is a good argument, or a satisfactory picture of what organisms are. 
 
When Kant famously declares that there will never be a Newton of a blade of grass (“it is 
absurd for human beings . . . to hope that perhaps some day another Newton might arise 
who would explain to us, in terms of natural laws unordered by any intention, how even a 
mere blade of grass is produced,” Kant 1790/1987, § 75, 282-283), or when Leibniz insists 
that the difference between a „machine of nature‟ and an artificial machine is that a 
machine of nature, a living being, is a machine to infinity, they are both clinging to the 
idea of an invisible inside or interiority which constructions and reconstructions cannot 
grasp: 
Moreover, by means of the soul or form there is a true unity corresponding 
to what is called the SELF [moi] in us; such a unity could not occur in 
artificial machines or in a mere mass of matter, however organized it may 
be; such a mass can only be considered as an army or a herd, or a pond full 
of fish, or like a watch composed of springs and wheels (Leibniz 
1695/1978, 482). 
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This closely resembles the view known as „agent causation‟ in action theory and moral 
philosophy more broadly. Just as the above descriptions of what a living agent 
(„organism‟) stress that its unity is derived from a particular type of selfhood or internal 
unity, versus the „masses‟ or „aggregates‟ encountered in physical nature overall, theorists 
of agent causation insist that acts flow from an agent in a way completely different to, and 
unexplainable in terms of, the causal processes at work in the rest of the natural world. 
Agent causation was a prominent view in action theory starting in the 1960s, and is 
sometimes traced back to Thomas Reid, but an early practitioner is in fact the Cambridge 
Platonist Ralph Cudworth, insisting in his posthumous treatise on free will that the soul 
exercises “hegemonic” control over itself; “ye whole Soule Redoubled upon it Selfe, 
which being as it were within it Selfe, and comprehending it Selfe . . . hath a Sui potestas 
over it Selfe, and can command it Selfe or turne it Selfe this way and that way” (Cudworth 
1838, § X, 36). The organism as subjectivity is very much this self “redoubled upon 
itself,” which cannot be grasped by any componential analysis. 
 
In contrast, the „artificialist‟ position points to the heuristic dimension of a mechanism as 
being „built so as to see what‟s inside it‟ (in the sense articulated already by the physicist 
William Thomson: “I am never content until I have constructed a mechanical model of the 
object that I am studying. If I succeed in making one, I understand; otherwise, I do not”; 
Thomson 1884, 270; Cassirer 1950, 115). Obviously, an organism construed in 
instrumental, relational and projective terms is not so far removed from such a mechanism 
(I discuss some of the implications of the „projective‟ concept of organism below, § 6). 
Does this prevent the biologist or the philosopher of biology from articulating „laws of 
life‟? Not really. The specificity of life can be treated in functional terms, rather than 
arguing for a special substance (substantival vitalism). One can conceive of a functional 
vitalism, as Barthez (1806) did, using a Newtonian analogy: call the „vital force‟ an X, an 
unknown, and that will allow me to formulate laws specific to living beings, without 
making any ontological claims as to this force. To be precise, overtly, Barthez says he will 
analyze the „something‟ that differentiates living bodies from dead bodies like one 
analyzes the “unknown quantities” of the geometricians: “The thing found in living beings 
which is not found in the dead, we shall call Soul, Archaeus, Vital Principle, X, Y , Z, like 
the unknown quantities of the geometricians. We only need to determine the value of this 
unknown, the assumption of which facilitates and shortens the calculation of phenomena” 
(Barthez 1806, vol. 1, 16). The idea is that the relevant biological property will be treated 
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in the way that Newton treated gravity epistemologically, as “a (provisionally) 
inexplicable explicative device” (Hall 1968, 14).  
 
We might recognize in this „functional vitalism‟ a basic insight of functionalism in the 
philosophy of mind; but just as an interrelated concept of mechanism and organism allows 
one to retain a dimension of embodiment when dealing with mechanisms, and a dimension 
of structural or componential analysis when dealing with organisms, similarly, the 
defender of functional vitalism will still be preoccupied in explanatory terms with the fact 
that the systems she studies are … alive, embodied in a particular kind of matter (Wolfe 
and Terada 2008). As I say below (§ 8) with respect to systems theories (a diverse family 
in which holism and functionalism can both be found), one must be careful not to leave 
out the matter. 
 
 5. 
 
If the history of mechanisms and organisms shows a significant degree of interplay, with 
mechanical models of Life aiming after all to explain … Life, and organismic theories in 
at least some cases (when they are not built on the foundations of non-spatial, extra-causal 
agents such as souls, entelechies or subjectivities) comprising organizational features, 
what about more theoretical approaches? 
 
In more purely conceptual terms, there is no a priori criterion that allows one to 
distinguish a living being from a non-living being, whether the integrity of the organism, 
its self-regulation (homeostasis), or „metabolism‟ (selected by Hans Jonas as a crucial 
distinguishing feature of organisms); after all, the defining claim of cybernetics was to 
have produced working models of just such features, rehabilitating „purposive‟ concepts 
without any „vitalist‟ overtones16). These features are always post facto observations, 
starting from within a temporal process. In that sense, the relation between living and non-
living, organism and machine, is an empirical relation, which does not allow one to claim 
qualitative differences between laws of nature. As Rosen says, “there is as yet no list of 
tests, characteristics or criteria we can apply to a given material system that can decide 
                                                 
16
 Wiener explicitly focused on Cannon‟s idea of homeostasis when defining what he called “negative 
feedback” (Fox Keller 2008 and 2009); hence Ashby‟s choice of the term „homeostat‟ (Ashby 1948). 
Current cognitive science even discusses “homeostatic plasticity” in robots (Barandirian and Di Paolo 2010). 
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whether that system is an organism or not”; “the decision as to whether a given system is 
an organism is entirely a subjective, intuitive one, based on criteria that have so far 
resisted formalization” (Rosen 1985, 166-167). 
 
In other words, given that the science of life is founded on mechanistic concepts which in 
and of themselves deny the specificity of life (even if these concepts or models, like 
Vaucanson‟s duck, are also heuristic models of the complexity of living systems), its 
construction of a „boundary concept‟ called „organism‟ is necessarily a posteriori. What 
this entails is that any kind of strong (ontological) vitalism, strong claim about organism, 
essentialist-substantialist view, will be based on what is at best a heuristic fiction – which 
for some of us is not a problem! (Wolfe 2006) 
 
When I say „heuristic fiction‟ I have in mind the Kantian point concerning organism as a 
regulative principle (instantiating the idea of a natural purpose), a point reiterated in 
different ways by Goldstein and Dennett. Kant is extremely cautious about the possibility 
that “nature as a whole is an animal,” a giant organism, as it were: it does indeed help to 
support the hypothesis of the purposiveness of nature, but if we really believe it to be true 
we fall into a circle since we are attributing to Nature properties we know in organized 
beings, and can never know if it possesses these properties itself (Kant 1790/1987, § 73, 
276). Epistemologically, the point one can derive from Kant, Goldstein and Dennett is that 
in order to be able to understand an entity we need to project certain features onto it; but 
these features should not be held to be constitutive of certain „regions‟ of the real. 
Organism in this „Kantian‟ vein is a regulative ideal in the sense that it is something 
posited as necessary for our intellects to be able to grasp a nightingale or an orang-outang 
(or even a blade of grass) as intentional agents; it is not a statement about the properties of 
the real. Much work has been done in recent years on Kant‟s ideas and their significance 
for contemporary philosophy of biology (see Huneman (ed.), 2007); all I want to 
emphasize is that for Kant, organism is a “reflective” construct rather than a “constitutive” 
feature of reality, and reflective judgments are “incapable of justifying any objective 
assertions” (Kant 1790/1987, § 67, 259; § 73, 277).18 
                                                 
18
 Of course the posterity of Kant‟s ideas in biology has little to do with his own strictures on how to 
approach organic life: not only were the self-limitations of the critical philosophy ignored or deliberately 
reversed by Romantics, Naturphilosophen, „Idealists‟ such as Hegel and Schelling (Huneman 2006); Kant 
has also served as a source of new biological ideas (including self-organization) repeatedly in the later 20
th
 
and early 21
st
 centuries (e.g. Weber and Varela 2002), in ways he would not have approved of. Even Konrad 
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In the shift from Kant to Goldstein and Dennett, what is new is that it is the organism itself 
which is being credited with this projective capacity. It has also been argued that the 
similarity between Kant‟s „regulative‟ idea and Dennett‟s intentional stance (Dennett 
1987) indicates that Dennett‟s naturalism fails, or is inadequate (Ratcliffe 2001). As I 
indicate below, I think the idea that we – and other animals – are „projectors‟, as it were, 
should not spell the end of any naturalistic project, except perhaps 1950s behaviorism. 
Dennett‟s intentional stance idea is meant to account for  
the ability of animals to make reliable predictions about the behavior of 
others given their complete ignorance of the biological mechanisms that 
govern behavior. Since we ordinarily have no access to the internal 
mechanisms governing the behavior of our fellow creatures, we must adopt 
. . . the intentional stance towards them. [This] is a strategy that begins with 
the assumption that other animals (including people) tend to pursue 
outcomes that serve their interests and that they have been equipped by 
natural selection with suitable perceptual and cognitive capacities . . . 
(Symons 2002, 43). 
 
In the case of Goldstein, there is more of an emphasis on the organism as a producer of 
intelligible totalities, as a system which actualizes itself and thereby enters into an 
adequate relation to its environment (Goldstein 1934/1995, 325). But in both cases there is 
a sense that our cognitive or perceptual make-up is necessarily „organismic‟, and indeed 
its being so contributes to our aptitude for survival. In contrast, the genuinely Kantian 
view is not a description of any part of Nature itself; it is, depending on the context, an 
epistemological view but also what I‟ve called a projective concept of organism. 
 
Hegel and Schelling abandoned this Kantian self-limitation in their philosophies of nature 
as organism. Schelling described the organism as “the perfect mirror-image of the absolute 
in Nature and for Nature” (Schelling 1803/1988, 51). For Hegel and Schelling, the task of 
writing a philosophy of nature is in large part in order to articulate a philosophy of 
organism, as a cosmic principle, an account of the universe itself as organic. To illustrate 
this tension, one can think of Goethe‟s story in Poetry and Truth (chapter IX), in which he 
describes his excitement upon ordering d‟Holbach‟s System of Nature, because of its title, 
which for Goethe implied an animate, pantheistic universe; when it arrived, he was 
                                                                                                                                                   
Lorenz was part of this trend, contributing an essay to the Yearbook of the Society for General Systems 
Theory on how to interpret Kant‟s notion of the a priori and the categories in the light of contemporary 
biology. Lorenz argues that the categories and our structures of perception overall are evolutionary 
adaptations of our nervous system to pressures of the real, natural world (Lorenz 1975). 
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horrified at this “dark and cadaverous work.”19 Goethe stands for philosophy of Nature as 
an attack upon mechanistic, quantitative science and its principle; he had mistakenly 
thought the System of Nature belonged to his intellectual family. This fits quite 
symmetrically with his response to Kant: “the Critique of Judgment fell into my hands and 
with this book a wonderful period came into my life” (“The influence of modern 
philosophy”, cit. in Huneman 2006, 665); Judith Schlanger says nicely that Goethe 
“overevaluated organicity as individual life” (Schlanger 1971, 108).20 
 
For different reasons – but always motivated by a certain concept of organism, usually 
buttressed by certain „empirical‟ claims (about embryo development, metabolism or just 
the sovereignty of human beings in the natural universe, notably because of their particular 
mode of „awareness‟ or „inwardness‟), the same „ontologization‟ of organism occurs in 
Driesch, Jonas, and those who favor a „revival of Aristotelianism‟. While Jonas (and 
differently, Varela) are making claims about individuality and self-awareness, Driesch‟s 
argument for the uniqueness of organism via entelechies is the classic case of scientific 
concepts that have been oddly hypostatized: while his experiments had shown that 
perfectly normal organisms could develop from embryos which had suffered from severe 
injuries produced by the experiment – thus, whole organisms resulted from abnormal 
growth conditions – Driesch derived from this the consequence that since the “formative 
power” at work is not interfered with by division, separation or displacement, “it must be a 
„something‟ without spatial character and to which no definite position in space can be 
assigned”21; an entelechy.  
 
Others (e.g. Schlick 1953, but also unexpected figures such as Bakhtin, see Bakhtin 
1926/1992) have pointed to the mistakes in scientific reasoning here; I only wish to 
emphasize that Driesch is one of a variety of figures for whom the reality of organisms is 
an essential fact, including in the sense that it flows from their essence. The mistake that 
concerns us here is that of turning potentially significant facts about embryo development 
into ontologically irreducible features; and where Driesch posits an entity that actually 
                                                 
19
 Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, XI, in Goethe 1887-1919, pt. 1, vol. 28, 69. 
20
 On the shift from regulative ideals to the ontologization of organism and/or vital force, see Larson 1979, 
Richards 2002, Reill 2005; for more on this aspect of Kantian thought cf. Huneman (ed.), 2007 and 
Huneman 2010. 
21
 Driesch 1908, I, B, “The Foundations of the Physiology of Development”: “Experiments on the Egg of the 
Sea-Urchin.” 
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does not exist, the entelechy, Jonas makes the same kind of mistake, but on the basis of 
features that do exist, such as metabolism and homeostasis. This is basically what D‟Arcy 
Thompson criticized Haldane for: “The alleged phenomena of self-production, self-
maintenance, and self-regulation are the common currency of those who, finding the 
mechanistic theory difficult and unsatisfactory, are content to postulate a something 
„which interferes with and guides the physical and chemical reactions‟” (D‟Arcy 
Thompson, in Haldane, D‟Arcy Thompson et al. 1918, 12). As I shall discuss below (and 
bearing in mind the description I gave of „functional vitalism‟ in § 4), this form of 
„ontologization‟ is to be opposed to the projective view of Kurt Goldstein (just as it is to 
Kant‟s view). 
 
6. 
 
One can distinguish, then, between  
 
- a methodological (this is also the functional view, or what Goldstein calls 
„constructivist‟ and I call „projective‟) vision of organism 
and 
- an ontological vision of organism (i.e. the ontologization of organism against 
which Kant argues)
22
 
 
However, I will not be content with reiterating this opposition, for both of these familiar 
positions suffer either from being impoverished or over-nourished. The methodological 
view is closely tied to the instrumental conception of biology, and even more closely tied 
to functional conceptions, which, as I discuss in closing, run the risk of leaving out the 
matter in which systems are realized entirely. And the ontological view tells us too much; 
it should be possible to argue for an ontological status of organisms, e.g. in Bernardian 
„realist‟ terms, without being committed either to entelechies, contemplative inwardness, 
or eternal life. 
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 This distinction unwittingly, but fittingly mirrors the first two out of three in Ayala‟s distinction between 
methodological, ontological and theoretical reduction (Ayala 1974), although the latter would probably find 
an analogue in programs such as systems biology (one can imagine correlating „homeostatic property 
clusters‟ of different kinds of organismic wholes, real and simulated). 
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In the 20
th
 century, the ontological vision is espoused variously by figures including 
Driesch, Jonas, and Ruyer. This tension between a methodological, constructivist view and 
an ontological, essentialist view also runs through a good deal of biological thought. For 
instance, the methodological vision is compatible with „functional vitalism‟. The Vienna 
Circle critique, beginning with Schlick, targets Driesch for not respecting the causal 
closure principle. Rather than being content with this response to the vitalist, I‟m 
interested in the instrumental notion, i.e., to speak with Dennett, my projection of 
intentional traits onto X serves an evolutionary purpose, rather than treating X as a mass of 
molecules; hence in this way the Kantian-Goldsteinian view can be augmented in 
Darwinian fashion, in which the capacity of certain types of embodied agents to project 
organismic features onto other agents would reflect some part of their evolutionary 
history. This Darwinian dimension additionally allows for an approach to organisms other 
than the once-omnipresent „non-reductive physicalism‟: it does not force one to hold that 
higher-level entities such as tigers and buttercups are „constructs‟ while the entities of 
physics are somehow more real (sometimes instrumentalist arguments rely on a kind of 
„lazy sophism‟ gesturing towards a physicalist ontology, from which one gains little; cf. 
Wilson 2006). 
 
When drawing distinctions between two ways of viewing the concept of organism, it is 
important to note that Goldstein himself – in what remains one of the major works on the 
topic – can be read both ways: on the one hand he defends a strong, Goethean-ontological 
view he calls „holistic‟, and on the other hand, he articulates a heuristic/methodological 
perspective as an approach to the brain-damaged patient‟s reconstituting of a personal 
„unity‟.23 Goldstein points empirically to the „fact‟, the „property‟ of our brains that they 
construct unity or totality, as a normal state but also in response to abnormal situations; 
but he also ontologizes this into a property of „the organism‟ that somehow removes it 
from the world of causality and mechanistic natural science. However, he wants to go on 
calling this „biology‟. Is he a vitalist? Clearly not in the sense of Driesch. And his concept 
of organism is not a self-production in the sense of a strong vitalism, since it‟s an interplay 
or „debate‟ (Auseinandersetzung) between internal needs and the environment (his 
“fundamental biological law” [biologische Grundgesetz], which Goldstein sometimes 
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 Much of Goldstein 1934/1995 is devoted to the problem. The first 2 chapters discuss empirical cases of 
brain-damaged patients in the process of rebuilding a sense of a „unified‟ world; chapters 9 and 11 are 
particularly devoted to biological theory (parts and wholes, organic hierarchies, etc.). 
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equates with Wertheimer‟s „prägnanz‟ or „pregnanz‟ law in Gestalt psychology, even if he 
also expresses caution about applying the laws from one „field‟ to another, and thus 
doesn‟t think one can directly have a Gestalt biology (Goldstein 1934/1995, 285). 
However, contrary to Pavlov or Sherrington, Goldstein‟s holism describes behavior, not in 
a localized sense as a reaction to an event in the environment, but as a function of organic 
totality, or even a kind of “biological a priori” that the organism always strives to achieve 
or attain (hence his frequent reference to „actualization‟ and „self-actualization‟), as an 
individual norm. There is something „metaphysical‟ here. The position I‟m terming 
„instrumental‟, or „methodological‟, „constructivist‟, or above all, „projective‟ benefits 
from insights drawn from the more methodologically oriented side of Goldstein‟s account. 
(No work that I am aware of brings out these two dimensions in Goldstein, certainly not 
the discussion of holism; Canguilhem‟s own „philosophy of life‟, inspired by Goldstein, 
comes closer.
24
) 
 
At this point a word of clarification, or of stock-taking, is in order. It may seem as if I have 
continuously presented an opposition between two views, a strong and a weak view of 
organism, and illustrated how the strong view is committed to various kinds of anti-
naturalistic and perhaps solipsistic tenets which make it difficult to embrace as a view of 
organism consonant with our „best knowledge‟ of biological practice. While this may be 
true, the problem then remains as to what the weak view is, and if there is only one. 
Indeed, if we turn to „weak‟ theories of organism, there is something very appealing about 
the instrumental view (organism is a useful concept inasmuch as it captures some of the 
empirical material we need to work out, but it can be discarded in favour of any other 
pragmatically useful concept; very much a functionalist view); and what I‟ve called the 
projective view is partly related to this. The projective view, which I have attributed to 
Kant, Goldstein (in one of his moods) and Dennett, holds that organism is something we 
project onto the world, a kind of construction of intelligibility; it is then an epistemological 
version of the concept of organism, admittedly with a Darwinian twist when Dennett 
(partly anticipated by Konrad Lorenz, see Lorenz 1975) suggests that higher organisms 
need to be able to project what Goldstein would have called organismic totality onto 
certain types of agents, minimally for survival reasons, to which one could add various 
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 Canguilhem explicitly credits Goldstein with influencing him on this point in the essay “The Normal and 
the Pathological” (Canguilhem 2008, 129, 132). For further discussion of this relationship see Borck, Hess 
and Schmidgen (eds.) 2005, especially the contribution by A. Métraux, and Wolfe (ms., 2009) 
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accounts of sociality, „Machiavellian intelligence‟ and the like. But none of these views 
give us any purchase on realist notions of the organism as they existed – without 
metaphysical underpinnings – in the work of major figures in the history of biology, such 
as Claude Bernard (see above, § 4). If we need such systems to make our theories come 
out right, then there is a sense in which organisms are part of our ontology, whatever the 
molecular stance may be.
25
  
 
7. 
 
If the organism does not exist as such, there is no use in crying „reductionist!‟… faced 
with de-naturing instances like cloning or prostheses! Much as Claude Bernard had stated 
that “there is only one physiology,”26 we could broadly add that there are not two natures 
but one Nature. But isn‟t there something that distinguishes higher organisms from the rest 
of the natural imperium? One can answer, with Goldstein, in the affirmative: individuality 
(Goldstein was in fact quite careful not to make claims for the uniqueness of human beings 
within the natural world, a mistake he diagnosed in the philosophical anthropology 
tradition). In a type of argument going back to Aristotle, the suggestion is: look around, 
and organisms are in fact the best candidates for individual substances. Organisms are 
“paradigmatic individuals,”27 or, as Gilbert Simondon put it, the production of a living 
being is a process of individuation.
28
 One could also adduce Claude Bernard‟s notion of 
milieu intérieur and his insistence that the organism must be treated as an individuality: 
“the physiologist and the physician must never forget that the living being comprises an 
organism and an individuality . . . If we decompose the living organism into its various 
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 Thanks to Dominic Murphy for helping me see this more clearly. 
26
 “Il n'y a qu‟une seule manière de vivre, qu'une seule physiologie pour tous les êtres vivants” (Bernard 
1885, 3
e
 leçon, “Division des phénomènes de la vie,” § III : “Réfutation générale des théories dualistes de la 
vie entre les animaux et les végétaux,” 148-149). Similarly, in his summary and presentation of Bernard‟s 
lectures, Paul Bert denies that there could be “two contradictory natures giving rise to two opposed orders of 
science” (Bernard 1885, xxviii-xxix). 
27
 Schlanger 1971, 42; Hull 1992, 182. On the individuality of organisms in a related sense see Symons 2010 
and Pradeu 2010. 
28
 Canguilhem and Simondon have in common the project of defending a particular notion of individuation 
within the biological realm itself, in the sense that „life is not possible without the individuation of living 
beings‟. However, what distinguishes Simondon from this Goldsteinian trend is that he does not at all wish 
to reassert a metaphysics of the individual as an insurpassable term, but rather to „processualize‟ the 
individual, to display the individual as the result of a process of individuation. For Simondon, it is not the 
individual who is the ground of the process of individuation, but rather individuation which grounds the 
individual. 
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parts, it is only for the sake of experimental analysis, not for them to be understood 
separately” (Bernard 1865/1984, II, ii, § 1, 137). 
 
This individuality can also be conceived of phenomenologically, as I have mentioned 
earlier (§ 3), through the features of temporality and historicity, as in Goldstein‟s 
statement “The organism is a historical being” (Goldstein 1934/1995, 387). Does 
Goldstein just mean that the organism has a capacity to provide adaptive responses to the 
„problems‟ or „challenges‟ posed by the environment, as it “selects” the relevant events 
occurring in that environment (84)? While he does say this, he also goes on in more 
„Goethean‟ form (thereby matching the duality of methodological and ontological levels of 
his analysis that I described above) to say that “the organism is a being enduring in time,” 
and curiously enough “in eternal time, for it does not commence with procreation, 
certainly not with birth, and does not end with death” (387). We are reminded of his rather 
Romantic insistence on the organism‟s perpetual self-actualization, which lacks a 
recognition of life‟s more Darwinian challenges: “Life always has a positive character, it 
never manifests itself in negative terms” (388-389). Notice that, while Goldstein‟s 
phrasing may make him seem remote at times from current biological theorizing, the view 
of the organism as a type of entity which either can be understood apart from evolutionary 
models and explanations, or indeed should be understood in such a way, is alive and well: 
We cannot answer the question . . . „Why is a machine alive‟? with the 
answer „Because its ancestors were alive‟. Pedigrees, lineages, genealogies 
and the like, are quite irrelevant to the basic question. Ever more insistently 
over the past century, and never more so than today, we hear the argument 
that biology is evolution; that living systems instantiate evolutionary 
processes rather than life; and ironically, that these processes are devoid of 
entailment, immune to natural law, and hence outside of science 
completely. To me it is easy to conceive of life, and hence biology, without 
evolution (Rosen 1991, 254-255; for a more cautious claim about 
understanding organisms apart from evolution see Wouters 2005).  
 
This is not so different from Varela‟s view, quoted above (§ 3), that living systems need 
not or should not be grasped in evolutionary terms. But here I wish to emphasize the more 
naturalistic part of Goldstein‟s point: the organism not only responds to challenges in real 
time, but has a „temporal essence‟. As Skarda and Freeman put it, the difference between 
biological agents and non-biological agents is that non-biological agents do not operate 
under global constraints (neural or „organismic‟; for more discussion of the specific 
constraints operating in organisms see Mossio and Moreno 2010): 
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Storms, for example, are self-organized phenomena that can be 
mathematically modeled using the same principles we use to model neural 
dynamics. A storm takes in and gives out energy. . . . Storms, however, do 
not exhibit adaptive responses; . . . their system does not incorporate 
information about its environment. The storm may, for example, move 
towards land, but it does not do so under the constraint to survive as a unity 
(Skarda and Freeman 1987, 173). 
 
Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno call this „autonomy‟ rather than the more broad „unity‟: the 
capacity of a system to manage the flow of matter and energy through it so that it can, at 
the same time, regulate, modify, and control: (i) internal self-constructive processes and 
(ii) processes of exchange with the environment. Thus, the system must be able to 
generate and regenerate all the constraints –including part of its boundary conditions – that 
define it as such, together with its own particular way of interacting with the environment 
(Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004, 240). 
 
The organism is a temporal-historical being in „dialogue‟ with its environment. However, 
this approach at times risks breaching the Kantian limit, making organism a category of 
meaning or value from the outset, not a posteriori. One can hold its „unity‟ (Skarda and 
Freeman), „autonomy‟ (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno) or „totality‟ (Goldstein) to be real 
without positing an essence, an ineffable „something‟ threatened by a universe of measures 
and formalizations. Even the convinced reductionist should be able to accept the existence 
of a rudimentary teleology which „pulls‟ the organism towards a desirable state, like 
homeostasis, and this opens onto a „systems‟ perspective: von Bertalanffy felt that it was 
“hardly be a matter of dispute” that “phenomena in the organism are chiefly „whole-
forming‟ or „system-forming‟ in character and that it is the task of biology to establish 
whether and to what extent they are so”; however, he acknowledged that the interpretive 
difficulty arises as soon as observers portray such forms of organization as embodying 
“will,” “purpose,” and “goals” (von Bertalanffy 1932, in Cassirer 1950, 215). To repeat a 
formulation I suggested above, one theorist‟s „homeostasis‟ is another theorist‟s 
„homeostat‟, that is, for every purportedly irreducible – and real – form of organismic 
unity, there will be a model which seeks to reproduce it.  
 
However, contrary to defenders of the ontological vision of organism, I do not see any 
„danger‟ in the mechanistic picture, which, as we recall, was the basis for the articulation 
of biology in the first place! Metaphysically, the position I am suggesting – Kant read a 
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certain way, Goldstein read a certain way – is that the „form‟ of life is there for us. It‟s a 
heuristic construction, a projection which reflects our desire to understand x as a totality. 
That we are, by dint of our nervous systems, „projectors‟ does not mean we project any 
structure we choose onto the world: “To understand is always to construct a (meaningful) 
totality.”29 And as this is to be taken in intersubjective terms, there is no need to postulate 
a hidden interiority. Recall that „organism‟, as a way of designating internal unity, served 
as a substitute for „soul‟, once there was no „ghost in the machine‟ to explain animation. It 
was exactly in those terms that Leibniz spoke of organisms, as quoted above (§ 4): 
opposing the internal unity of organisms to the scattered „heaps of matter‟ or at best 
aggregates existing in the rest of the universe. 
 
8. 
 
If we subject the concept of organism to the three „monistic‟ conditions outlined in § 3, the 
result is two somewhat disparate traits: (a) organisms are real inasmuch as they exhibit 
certain forms of Bernardian, organizational unity and are not just façons de parler, verbal 
constructs (it is not just „handsome is as handsome does‟, i.e., defining an organism as 
„whatever we project onto it‟); but (b) part of their reality is to be „projectors‟, to create 
intelligibility. In that sense one might speak of a production of a vital artificiality (Wolfe 
2006). This is not a self-production in the sense of a strong vitalism, since it‟s an interplay 
or „debate‟ between internal needs and the environment, a dynamic equilibrium along the 
lines of Goldstein‟s “fundamental biological law,” interrelating the organism‟s self-
actualization and the stimuli and constraints received from the environment. Far from 
being an appeal to a mysterious substance or „wonder tissue‟, this sense of a stable process 
of self-actualization is very close to what we would call today a definition of organism in 
terms of its “causal closure,” a process of modulation whereby organism:environment 
interactions are modulated so as to maintain the conditions under which the agent can 
retain those very interactions.
30
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 Starobinski 1956, 5, 11; Goldstein 1934/1995, chap. 9. See also Barbaras 1999. 
30
 Goldstein 1934/1995, 101, 103, 107, 293; Christensen and Hooker 1998; on organizational constraints see 
Ruiz-Mirazo, Etxeberria et al. 2000; Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2004; Mossio and Moreno 2010; Nuño de la 
Rosa 2010. 
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This reconstructed concept of organism does not repeat the existentialist leitmotive of 
subjectivity, possibility, and mortality (even if, of course, we allowed for a temporal 
dimension of organism which implies the „sting‟ of mortality31). After all, this 
„fundamental biological law‟ of interchange between an internal system and its own 
environment, being an inherently relational concept, is doubtless expressible in 
„structural‟ terms, so that organisms can only be „paradigmatic individuals‟ in and through 
such a „debate‟ or „relation‟ to a population, a group or an environment as a whole 
(Lewontin 1983/1985, Oyama 2000). 
 
But an apposite danger awaits the biological theorist who has fully desubstantialized her 
concept of organism, ridding it both (if it bears saying) of metaphysical flourishes like 
entelechies or élans vitaux and of category mistakes such as the assertion that the 
organism‟s self-maintenance, or unity, or metabolic transformation are markers of the 
uniqueness of Life. She may arrive at a rather dematerialized form of holism, in which the 
emphasis on relations causes one to lose sight of the biological. At first it sounds perfectly 
plausible, if residually idealistic, to ask, like Paul Weiss, “Of what do we deprive a system 
when we dismember it and isolate its component parts, whether bodily or just in our mind? 
Plainly, of the interrelations that had existed among the parts while they were still united” 
(Weiss 1967, 802), although this runs directly counter both to the old sense of mechanism 
as building a model in order to understand one‟s object (cf. Thomson 1884), as a form of 
„maker‟s knowledge‟, and to more recent discussions of a kind of expanded, pluralistic 
sense of mechanism (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000). The real problem with this 
kind of approach – systemic, processual, relational, etc.; we could just say holistic –
comes out more sharply in the formulation proposed by Robert Rosen, namely, that the 
reductionist approach to living systems is to “throw away the organization and keep the 
underlying matter,” whereas what he calls, following Nicolas Rashevsky, the “relational 
approach” in biology, recommends that “when studying an organized material system,” 
one should “throw away the matter and keep the underlying organization” (Rosen 1991, 
119, sounding much like Varela and Maturana claiming that to understand machines we 
must disregard their materiality: Varela and Maturana 1972, 380). 
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 Thinking of Jonas‟ comment that Whitehead‟s philosophy of organism lacks any awareness of death: 
“Death, where is thy sting?” (Jonas 1966, 96). 
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This is really both anti-materialist and „informational‟ in an obsessive way (see Oyama 
2000 and 2010 for some reflections on the non-dits of the informational perspectives in 
biology). Ironically, this is the sort of mistake the early Montpellier vitalists protested 
about with respect to anatomy, which had had so much success in the century prior to their 
writings (the 16
th
 and 17
th
 primarily): that it gave the investigator much information about 
structure and nothing about the functioning of the living animal or human. Varela is quite 
blunt in his disregard for the material in which a system is realized: “We are thus saying 
that what defines a machine‟s organization is relations, and hence that the organization of 
a machine has no connection with materiality, that is, with the properties of the 
components that define them as physical entities. In the organization of a machine, 
materiality is implied but does not enter per se” (Varela 1979, 9, cit. in Bechtel 2007, 
294).
32
 
 
Holism then suffers from a general weakness and a more specific problem. The more 
generic worry about holism and its „relational‟ emphasis was stated by Russell: “if all 
knowledge were knowledge of the universe as a whole, there would be no knowledge” 
(Russell, in Phillips 1976, 11). We could call this the epistemological criticism of holism. 
A more ontological criticism would be to say that a mistake has been made about what 
wholes really are: 
. . . the Whole itself is a product, produced as nothing more than a part 
alongside other parts, which it neither unifies nor totalizes, though it has an 
effect on other parts simply because it establishes aberrant paths of 
communication between noncommunicating vessels, transverse unities 
between elements that retain all their differences within their own particular 
boundaries (Deleuze and Guattari 1973/1977, 42). 
 
Granted, this seems to disregard the difference between different kinds of wholes, but it 
serves as a (mechanistic) reminder not to overemphasize the value of the concept „whole‟: 
brains, organisms and persons are wholes, to be sure, but so are lots of other entities, and 
conversely, different kinds of mechanist, componential, reductionist analysis tell us a lot 
about all of these wholes. But the more specific problem as it appears in the above 
quotations from Rosen and Varela is the complete disregard – it‟s even recommended! – 
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 Of course the dematerialized view also has some serious philosophy on its side (compare Symons 2010): 
“Many organisms totally exchange their substance several times over while they retain their individuality. 
Others undergo massive metamorphosis as well, changing their structure markedly. If organisms are 
paradigm individuals, then retention of neither substance nor structure is either necessary or sufficient for 
continued identity in material bodies” (Hull 1992, 182). 
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for the material facts about the living system being studied. The Bernardian approach to 
„organization‟ and its contemporary reconstruction by Bechtel seems an obvious response, 
which precisely insists that one should not “throw away the matter” (contra Rosen). Notice 
that the second problem I have pointed to in holism/system theory exists in much the same 
form in functionalism: the disembodied tendency in multiple realizability arguments in 
which, as Putnam put it, “we could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn't matter” 
(Putnam 1975, 291). Instead, we need to recognize that even the vitalist cannot ignore the 
biological matter in which a system is realized – the „organizational features‟ of a system. 
 
That said, there are versions of the „systems‟ view which are consonant with my monistic 
criteria in § 3: “system thinking does not imply forgetting about the material mechanisms 
that are crucial to trigger off a biological type of phenomenon/behavior; rather, it means 
putting the emphasis on the interactive processes that make it up, that is, on the dynamic 
organization in which biomolecules (or, rather, their precursors) actually get integrated” 
(Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004, 238). This helps bridge the gap between the systems 
perspective and the more materialistic, embodied „organizational‟ perspective. The latter 
perspective seems to make the best of both worlds – mechanism and organism – without 
relying on a superannuated ontology, but also without opting for the non-committal 
comfort of pure instrumentalism. In addition, this perspective seems to capture something 
worthwhile about the history – as seen with Bichat and Bernard in Bechtel‟s presentation, 
to which I added the 18
th
 century medical vitalists. What is missing from this view is the 
„projective‟ aspect which I reconstructed primarily from Goldstein‟s rather suggestive 
discussion of organism. 
 
Our inquiry into organism has produced two negatives and two positives: concepts of 
organism to be rejected include ones which invoke theoretical entities such as organismic 
laws: this is a kind of category mistake and probably scientifically of little use, and also 
ones which rely on a kind of ineffable subjectivity to justify the uniqueness of organisms. 
We could add the problem of the forms of holism which dispense with materiality 
altogether but, as I noted at the beginning (§ 2), in some basic sense holism never intended 
to be a specific theory of what living being is, even though the words „holism‟ and 
„organicism‟ have blurred into each other over time. Concepts of organism to be accepted, 
or integrated, include the Goldsteinian projective view (especially if it is mitigated with 
broadly „Darwinian‟ constraints), the non-metaphysical, functional vitalism of the 18th 
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century (in which organism or rather the „animal economy‟ and „organized bodies‟ are 
explanatory targets without any ontological baggage), and the Bernard-Bechtel 
organizational view. 
 
If, contrary to what strong ontological vitalism might assert, there is nothing unique and 
special about organisms over and against the rest of Nature; if, as Buffon thought, “the 
organic is the most ordinary product of nature,” what does exist is a certain approach to 
reality, the projection of heuristic fictions which produce intelligibility and promote viable 
courses of action. What remains to be done is (for instance) to articulate this philosophical 
position with work on biological organization. 
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